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STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE
STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE: A SOVIET
VIEWPOINT*
Roald Z. Sagdeyev**, Yevgeni P. Velikhov*** and Andrei A. Kokoshin****
I.

GENERAL

A space-based antimissile system, even if ideal from the scientific and
technological points of view, would never accomplish, as is contended by some
members of the U.S. political leadership, a "turnaround" in strategic thinking
to substitute the deterrence based on the concept of "mutual assured destruction,"
by the deterrence based on the concept of "mutual assured survival," since it
would not guarantee total protection from ballistic missiles and air-based strike
weapons. Therefore, all the arguments in favor of the allegedly stabilizing role
of comprehensive ballistic missile defense (BMD) make no sense. It is also worth
emphasizing that concurrently with the deployment of the Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI), the United States is actively pursuing a program of deployment
of strategic offensive arms, nuclear medium range forces, and theater nuclear
arms. Consequently, the development and deployment of a space-based BMD
would only complicate the issue of mutual deterrence and would lead to a more
precarious strategic balance.
Such a view of the proposed U.S. antimissile system as a way to enhance
the country's first strike capabilities is also determined by the fact that the United
States is not willing to commit itself not to use nuclear arms first, and continues
to build up its first strike capability. One important element of this policy was
the deployment in Europe of U.S. medium range nuclear armed missiles, notably
Pershing II rockets.
It would be pertinent to recall in this connection that the Soviet Union,
cognizant of the importance of enhancing the stability of the balance considering
the tense military and political situation, announced unilaterally in June of 1982
that it would not use nuclear arms first.
Drawing on past experience, one can assume with a high degree of probability
that the development of BMD would cause the deployment of a host of coun*
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termeasures to thwart the threat posed by it. One can agree with those experts
who believe that as a BMD would be developed and deployed, so would the
countermeasures. Also the BMD would be a strong incentive for the buildup of
strategic nuclear arsenals-both delivery means and warheads-in particular of
air-, sea- and ground-based long-range cruise missiles, whose deployment is, inter
alia, hardly amenable to control by national technical means.
One of the possible countermeasures would be to use depressed trajectories
for submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). This response would, in turn,
be interpreted by the American side as a threat to the bomber "leg" of the
strategic "triad," since this would imply shorter times for SLBMs to strike at
strategic bomber bases. A comprehensive BMD would thus disturb the synergy
of the triad structure of the strategic nuclear forces, which in the opinion of
U.S. military planners is an important factor in the stability of these forces.
Space-based antimissile weapons can, with good reason, be viewed as having
antisatellite capabilities.' And this is bound to undermine the balance within the
macrosystem of strategic relations, since the balance is in many respects determined by the degree of faith placed by the sides in the reliability of their
respective surveillance and early warning satellites.
A decision to intercept a satellite in space (using non-nuclear means, of
course) is clearly easier to make than a decision to use military force directly
against another country. Such an action may, however, trigger a conflict which
may escalate confrontation to direct hostilities, from regional to global and from
conventional to nuclear levels.
This stems specifically from the fact that antisatellite operations cannot, by
virtue of the laws of astrodynamics, be localized (by the distribution of the
targets and the weapons) and will immediately become global. An antisatellite
operation might suddenly develop into attacks at the most vulnerable components,
such as satellite communications and control facilities deployed on the ground
and at sea all over the world, and these attacks could hardly be confined to
conventional arms. The chain reaction of destroying the satellite systems, along
with other measures of disrupting the command, control and communications
systems would quickly render the situation uncontrollable, thus disrupting the
links between the national leaders and the forces in the field and the nation at
large, and as the uncertainties of the situation would be intensified, the probability
of a fatal mistake and unwarranted response would increase. On top of that
antisatellite actions would affect the space-based communications with strategic
forces-the "best" way of initiating a nuclear exchange.
A systems analysis of the stability of the strategic balance with the above
inputs shows that, contrary to what the SDI advocates say, should both sides
have comprehensive BMDs, instability would grow, especially considering the
wide variety of countermeasures and the vulnerability of BMD components.
One should emphasize that the so-called defensive space-based weapons that
are planned for development in the United States could in actual fact be employed
not only to strike against the Soviet Union's satellites and intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs) in flight, but also as a first strike weapon against ground and
air targets of an opponent. These weapons would be of special danger for
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countries that are unable, for economic, techological or territorial reasons, to
install adequate countermeasures against the threat from space, as are able the
Soviet Union and its allies in the Warsaw Treaty Organization, which might
enhance antagonism in the world.
The SDI program is especially dangerous because it appeals to the psychologically natural human desire to find at last some sort of protection against the
awesome destructive power of modern nuclear weapons. The advocates of the
Strategic Defense Initiative expertly cash in on this feeling.
The same goal is pursued by some Western strategic planners who argue
that, in compliance with the dialectics of the evolution of warfare concepts, the
predominantly offensive warfare of the past centuries must be replaced by a
predominantly defensive warfare of the future, and nuclear weapons, which have
underlined the military doctrines of the last few decades, must in turn be replaced
by some fundamentally new weapons, in this case, by the directed-energy weapons.
It is worth noting here that any references to the dialectics of warfare
concepts (which, by the way, has been given the best treatment by Friedrich
Engels in Anti-Diiring and by other classics of Marxism) is irrelevant in the case
of a space-based ballistic missile defense. Actually, the struggle between offense
and defense throughout history occurred with varying success. In the long run,
the general tendency seems to have been for the civilian population to suffer
ever increasingly from the horrors and destruction of wars. Recall World War I,
a classic example of the predominance of defense, which predetermined its trench
warfare tactics but involved a then-unheard-of scale of destruction over enormous
areas in the war zone (Marne, Verdun-sur-Meuse, Galicia, etc.). Nuclear weapons
stand out in this respect as weapons specially designed and first used by the
United States for massive destruction of civilian population and material assets.
The prospect of total destruction of peaceful civilians and devastation of enormous
areas has always overshadowed any attempts of Western strategists to invent
some ways of using these weapons to solve military missions, to inflict "limited"
and "selective" strikes.
The SDI proponents in the United States lean heavily on the thesis that, as
compared with the late 1960's and early 1970's when the U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty (of unlimited duration) was negotiated, there have now appeared
new technologies that change the situation between offense and defense in the
nuclear age. This thesis is used as a basis for far-reaching conclusions of
technological, political, and military character.
Among the latest breakthroughs in science and technology that allegedly
offer unprecedented defensive capabilities are mentioned advances in the hardware
and software branches of computer technology (faster speeds, microminiaturization, artificial intelligence elements, etc.), sensor technology, laser technology,
neutral particle accelerators, electrodynamical mass accelerators and a new generation of hefty boosters. In these and other fields of technology, substantial
strides have really been made as compared with the end of the 1960's and
beginning of the 1970's. It is to be stressed, however, that considering the rich
variety of elements in a hypothetical BMD, advances in individual areas provide
no solution to the problem as a whole.
Many U.S. sources, including the government, admit that as of now and in
the foreseeable future, these achievements are clearly insufficient to create a full
scale space-based BMD. Furthermore, the fashioning of a widely distributed
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macrosystem, with a tangle of links, out of individual components (detection,
recognition, aiming, battle management, weapons, etc.) is a fundamentally new,
exceedingly complex task.
Publicizing the defense-dominated world, a world that is only possible due
to the high level of sophistication of the current technologies, the sources pass
over in silence the fact that the same technological capabilities might, perhaps
even with more success, be used to create effective countermeasures. On the
other hand, offensive capabilities have in the last ten to fifteen years grown as
well, mostly due to U.S. initiatives. Worthy of special mention are multiple
independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), long range cruise missiles and
new highly accurate guidance systems for delivery vehicles. The development of
a new generation of SLBMs is nearing conclusion in the United States. These
sea-launched missiles will be compatible with land-based ICBMs in their destructive power.
Notice that expatiating about dazzling prospects of antimissile technologies,
the SDI officials "forget" to mention the prospects of development within the
same time scale of offensive technologies, which could clearly make spectacular
progress. These could include, as noted above, making MIRVs on ICBMs and
other vehicles maneuverable, converting SLBMs to depressed trajectories, using
more decoys and fast-burn boosters, and so on and so forth.
Comparison of the evolutions of defensive and offensive technologies puts
into question any prospects of a defensive system gaining some advantage.
Moreover, since the offensive and defensive strands are intertwined, should the
SDI plans be pursued, it would become necessary, and hence possible, to develop
a new class of weapons specially designed to degrade and nullify a BMD, first
of all its space-based components. Many technical means suitable for solving
such problems are in such high development stages in the United States itself
that, according to some U.S. experts, they could be realized much faster and
more cheaply than a comprehensive space-based BMD. In addition, many Western
observers maintain that initiating major SDI programs in a tense international
climate would spur the development of those mass destruction arms which are
beyond the capabilities of a BMD. In view of this, it is apparently not by chance
that, parallel with the discussion of the SDI plans, U.S. military planners raised
the question of the need of working out alternative measures against a potential
Soviet BMD (it has been repeatedly stressed by the Soviet government officials,
including the Minister of Defense, Marshal S. P. Sokolov, that the Soviet Union
2
does not work in this area).
Of course, there are some military research and development programs in
the Soviet Union, but they do not aim at developing space-based weapons. Their
objectives are improving space-based early warning, reconnaissance, communications and navigation satellites.
There are no preparations in the Soviet Union to deploy a nationwide BMD
based on air defense facilities, and no programs that could violate the ABM
Treaty of 1972 in general are under way.

2.
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Much coverage in Western mass media was given to the construction of a
radar site near Krasnoyarsk, in Siberia. It was contended that this radar is an
early warning radar against ICBMs and is being constructed in violation of the
Treaty.
Official Soviet spokesmen explained that the radar is designed to carry out
observations of space objects. The Agreed Statements regarding the 1972 Treaty
stipulate that the limitations on the potential of phased-array radars do not
include the radars used "for the purpose of tracking objects in outer space or
for use as national technical means of verification." Therefore, the Krasnoyarsk
facility is not in violation of the Treaty.
Even if in the forseeable future U.S.-Soviet relations improve so that the
American side will be prepared to negotiate mutually acceptable and equitable
constraints on strategic arsenals, then even the limited presence of tested and
deployed components of a space-based BMD would markedly complicate negotiations and drastically curtail the chances of achieving such agreements. That
this is really so is confirmed by the practice of negotiating SALT I and SALT
3
II. Without the ABM Treaty, they would simply have been unthinkable.
Introducing into the strategic equation a further radically new and allimportant component, such as a comprehensive BMD, would confuse the entire
system of assessing the strategic balance and would worsen the international
climate.
Things might be entangled even more, if one takes into consideration the
inevitable countermeasures of the other side, including those directed against the
space-based component of the proposed BMD, respective counter-countermeasures, and on indefinitely-a vicious circle so familiar to the designers of weapons.
The experience of the last decades has repeatedly proved that the Soviet
Union will not allow any shifts in the balance. Whatever the U.S. moves, the
balance will be restored, albeit at a higher level. The future world will thus' be
a world of more nuclear warheads aimed by the sides at each other, of shorter
times allowed for making fatal decisions, of higher risks of nuclear war.
The development of military technologies, the "action-counteraction" cycles
in the arms race, can make the course of events irreversible. Looking back at
the arms race of the past decades, one cannot help regretting many "initiatives."
Only some of them have been reversed, at great cost.
Can the arms race in space be prevented? There is a deep conviction on the
part of the Soviet Union that there are possibilities, yet they rely on a solid
foundation of international law, which contains many pertinent agreements.
One other political implication of the deployment by the United States of a
space-based BMD system is the fact that it would be in the way of U.S.-Soviet
cooperation in the uses of space for peaceful purposes. Scientifically and economically, this cooperation would be quite valuable, since the space programs of
the United States and Soviet Union are in many respects complementary. The
political importance of such a cooperation would be immense, especially for
U.S.-Soviet relations and for building confidence between the peoples of the two
great countries.
3.
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Should the world community find overhead in near-earth orbits offensive
and antisatellite weapons, the "space for peace" programs, from which humanity
at large could benefit enormously, would be in jeopardy.
II.

THE STRATEGIC BALANCE

The modern military and political landscape is characterized by a strategic
parity reached between the United States and the Soviet Union. The strategic
parity is an important condition for maintaining strategic stability, especially if
it provides mutual ability of both sides to launch assured retaliatory strikes
inflicting unacceptable damage. Such a state of affairs has proved to possess a
measure of stability, notwithstanding the significant difference in the geostrategic
position of the sides, the asymmetry in the structure of their nuclear forces and
the differences in the characteristics of their weapon systems.
In an attempt to break away from the nuclear blind alley and gain strategic
superiority, the United States spurted ahead in the 1960's in the arms race, and
in the 1970's tried repeatedly to tip the balance in its favor. Nevertheless, late in
the 1960's the Soviet Union answered with an increase in its strategic arsenal
and, despite the American efforts, it managed to restore parity. By the mid1980's, owing to countersteps taken by the Soviet Union, the strategic equilibrium
became more stable and balanced. 4 It is now more difficult than ever before to
disrupt the parity by increasing and improving nuclear forces, or to establish
supremacy of importance in military, political and diplomatic respects.
This margin of strength, inherent in the attained parity, is determined by a
multitude of factors, one of them being the very nature of nuclear weapons, i.e.,
their enormous destructive force and lethality, especially against cities, industrial
objects, ports and major military bases. A relatively small number of nuclear
warheads (hundreds out of the fifty thousand now in existence) are capable of
killing and maiming millions of people, destroying the economies of major
nations.
The stability of the balance is also ensured by the variety of complementary
ingredients in the strategic forces of each side, which includes land-based ICBMs,
sea-based SLBMs and strategic bomber forces. The presence of the synergy of
the three legs of the strategic triads of the United States and the Soviet Union
is one of the most important deterrents to first strikes capable of eliminating or
markedly weakening retaliatory second strikes. Both sides are capable of launching
a retaliatory strike inflicting unacceptable damage, this capability being due to
adequate duplicated systems of early warning about a nuclear missile attack, and
of command, control and communications; both sides' strategic forces are maintained at a high level of combat readiness.
These and other circumstances, now that the world has accumulated enormous arsenals of nuclear weapons, make the entire system of the nuclear strategic
balance relatively stable despite some technical differences in the nuclear weapons
of both sides. Of course, one should not overestimate the degree of stability of
the balance, which is essentially the "balance of terror," both military and
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political. The stability, even with the countermeasures taken by the Soviet Union,
may be undermined by the year 2000 because of the nuclear arms race enforced
by the American side whose aim is to gain unilateral first strike capabilities. 5
The balance of terror is a precarious balance. A really secure and peaceful
world is only possible when both sides (and any other nations) have no nuclear
arms. The world would be much safer if it were free of nuclear weapons and
respective delivery vehicles, if all conflicts were tackled by negotiations, if
economic, scientific and cultural international cooperation were improved and
expanded.
Instead, some powerful groups in the United States, notably in the militaryindustrial complex, would like to offer the world at large a vicious way of
ensuring safety by creating a comprehensive space-based BMD system.
The problem of protection from nuclear weapons made its appearance
together with nuclear weapons, and the major difficulties here were perceived as
early as in the 1940's.
In 1945 Robert Oppenheimer noted the exceptional role of nuclear weapons,
the inability of the then-technology to install effective countermeasures and the
need for a search for political solutions to the problem of international security.
During the past three decades, arguments more or less similar to those of
Oppenheimer had in various situations been echoed by many scientists, statesmen
and politicians. What then is behind the predominance of offense over defense
in the nuclear age?
This stems once again from the momentous destructive force of nuclear
weapons. With the advent of these weapons, the age-old confrontation of offense
("sword") and defense ("shield") reached a level beyond which offensive weapon
capabilities increased by jumps, in an unprecedented manner. For the strategic
forces of one side to be able to inflict unacceptable destruction on the other side
in a retaliatory strike, their effectiveness, measured as the ratio of the number
of warheads that reach their destinations to their initial number, can be as low
as one percent or even less.
Consequently, in our day a shield capable of fending off ninety-nine percent
of the accumulated nuclear arsenals makes no sense. The "leaked" one percent
would be sufficient to destroy our civilization. The defensive systems must be
very nearly one hundred percent effective. This unavoidable discrepancy in the
required effectiveness of offensive and defensive strategic systems is independent
of the level of technological progress, since both types of systems develop in the
same technological medium and the advances of scientific and technological
progress will be used equally in ballistic missile defenses and in offensive strategic
arsenals.
The statement that in our times offensive systems inherently predominate
may seem to be unproved, but it is inferred from a detailed analysis of all the
hypothetical antimissile defenses suggested. There are no grounds to doubt that
the advantage of offensive nuclear strategic forces will never be overcome by the
new BMDs envisioned within the framework of the Strategic Defense Initiative.

5.
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Taking into account the host of problems presented by the SDI program, we can
note the following:
1. The new version of an ABM defense would rely on space-based elements
which include both combat components and support components (detection,
identification and targeting, battle management, and so on). As noted above,
these components would be more vulnerable to countermeasures than ICBMs,
because they would be in known orbits, there would be fewer of them than the
ICBMs, MIRVs and decoys.
2. Even if today's ICBMs and SLBMs appear to be vulnerable to the new
hypothetical weapons of the proposed BMD, then even now the main directions
for modernizing offensive systems are quite apparent. Moreover, such a modernization would not require any revolutionary methods.
3. The development and deployment of a space-based ballistic missile defense
is bound, sooner or later, to bring about a dramatic improvement and massive
increase of offensive weapons on both sides.
Even some of the SDI advocates are forced to admit the momentous,
unparalleled technical problems that would be encountered by the developers of
a BMD. This is also obvious from the changed tenor of their statements. Whereas
in President Ronald Reagan's speech of March 23, 1983, which marked the
beginning of the SDI, and in some other subsequent reports, the deployment of
comprehensive BMD was viewed as an alternative to the world of mutual
deterrence, in the latest statements of SDI advocates one more often sees
recognitions that in the foreseeable future nuclear weapons will coexist with
antimissile weapons, and the strategic balance will still rely on the "mutual
assured destruction" concept. At the same time, it is recognized to some degree
that the most important conditions of the development of a comprehensive BMD
system are its survivability and cost-effectiveness. These ideas in particular are
reflected in statements made by Paul Nitze, one of the key authorities on military
and political issues among high-level advisers in the U.S. government. Says he,
"The criteria by which we will judge the feasibility of new technologies will be
demanding. They must produce defensive systems that are reasonably survivable .... New defensive systems must also be cost-effective at the margin, that
is, it must be cheaper to add additional defensive capability than it is for the
other side to add the offensive capability necessary to overcome the defense." ' 6
And whereas the earlier statements of the SDI proponents held that the
deployment of antimissile weapons would automatically result in curtailing offensive nuclear weapons, the later publications are not so optimistic. They note,
specifically, that a BMD could only be effective if significant constraints were
imposed on the number and characteristics of offensive systems and potential
countermeasures. What is more, some of the Western experts have now come up
with some specific suggestions as to such constraints, for example:
-Limit the deployment in low orbits of means threatening the space-based
components of ballistic missile defenses;
-Ban the development of new ballistic missiles with a shorter boost phase.

6.
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Judging by some Western reports these considerations had played a major
role in United States putting forward a ban on mobile ICBMs at the Geneva
talks on nuclear and space weapons. According to some estimates the deployment
of such systems, which feature a higher survivability of the ground-based component of the strategic forces in case of a nuclear strike, can be regarded as one
of the many countermeasures to the space-based BMD system.
It is paradoxical enough, but also remarkable, that hard-line proponents of
unilateral decisions in military and technological spheres, who reject any mutually
acceptable political arrangements aimed at strengthening security and arms limitations, are forced by the inexorable logic of the current strategic balance to
appeal to political and legal arguments to protect their concepts.
The above considerations engender serious doubts concerning the feasibility
not only of an "absolute" BMD eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear
missiles, but also of the various limited versions of a BMD (area and point
defenses), which, according to some SDI advocates, make the nuclear deterrence
policy more reliable.
The critique of the SDI concept from the viewpoint of its implications for
the strategic equilibrium includes, apart from those considered above, a number
of other substantial arguments put forward both by Soviet and Western scientists
and military planners.7 It should be emphasized that the many forms of a spacebased BMD that do not claim to be "absolute" can be thought of by both sides
as a defense against a weakened retaliatory nuclear strike.
Each side, which in its assessment of possible military conflicts proceeds
from the "worst case" analysis, will view the opponent's BMD as a threat to its
retaliatory capabilities. And to thwart this threat this side will develop its
countermeasures and develop its offensive forces. It will be recalled that both
MIRVs and decoys made their appearance precisely as countermeasures to the
other side's potential ABM systems.
The higher antiretaliatory capabilities of a BMD give its possessor a strong
incentive to launch a first strike.
These arguments, which became apparent back in the 1960's, were some of
the direct reasons for signing the ABM Treaty of 1972, which was then considered
to be a requisite instrument in the set of treaties to ban nuclear arms.
These considerations are sufficiently serious so that one could regard the
SDI program as a manifestation of the desire to establish military superiority, to
acquire first strike capabilities with impunity, and to do away with any bans on
offensive strategic forces. These apprehensions appear to be even more justified
in the context of the steadily worsening political international climate of the last
decades and of the well established, inflexible (and hence dated) views of the
many SDI advocates.
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But even if one forgets about the political realities of today's world, believes
unreservedly in the peaceful rhetoric of the SDI advocates and sets out to deploy
a parallel BMD, even then a number of serious consequences lowering the stability
of the strategic situation would follow.
As noted above, the immense destructive power of nuclear arms levels off,
to a certain degree, the differences in the characteristics of the elements of both
sides' offensive strategic forces. This allows a measure of destabilization in the
political and military climate while peace is still preserved, an example of which
was the mid-1980's chill in U.S.-Soviet relations.
The strategic equilibrium will be upset by the addition of space-based
weapons. The efficiency of antimissile systems is, to a significant degree, dependent both on their technical performance (the accuracy of sensors, detection
and targeting systems, the reliability of computer complexes of battle management
systems, the brightness of space or ground-based lasers, etc.), and on the
geographical arrangement of the offensive strategic forces of both sides. In
addition, it will be difficult to verify many characteristics of the hypothetical
defensive weapons not only by national technical means, but also by on-site
inspection.
Hypothetical treaties, which some SDI proponents think will ensure that
space-based ballistic missile weapons will be deployed step by step and that during
this deployment the strategic balance will be maintained, would have to include
a much wider range of issues than treaties limiting and curtailing offensive
strategic forces. A historical analysis of U.S.-Soviet arms control talks tells us
that a solution of these questions is highly unlikely, both politically and technologically.
The promises to share BMD technologies given by Washington, which are
aimed at providing gradual progress in the simultaneous deployment of BMD
systems by both sides and at maintaining needed stablility, cannot of course be
taken seriously because of these technologies being exceedingly sensitive both for
antimissile systems and for other key sectors of military technology, including
first-strike and countermeasure antimissile capabilities.
These considerations again show that one side is sure to lag behind in the
process of antimissile system deployment, which poses a serious threat to the
stability of the strategic balance.
Should one side deploy, if only partially, a defense system against weakened
retaliatory capability of the other side, the other side can regard this as violation
of conditions of mutual nuclear deterrence. And the other side can express its
concern in a number of ways, from active and passive countermeasures to placing
its reliance on the automatic "launch on warning" strategy.
A BMD will of course be more effective when used against a weakened
retaliatory strike than against a massive first strike, which is especially dangerous
because in a crisis this will tip the balance of the strategic equilibrium. In a
critical situation between two possessors of ballistic missile defenses, each side
will be better off by striking first. Moreover, a BMD will contribute to strategic
instability because the so-called "defensive" space weapons can be used as
offensive weapons, which for a start could knock out a counterpart BMD on
the other side (having spent only an insignificant part of its resources).'
8.
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It should be noted that the instabilities of a transitional period and the
special instability of the strategic balance in a crisis are characteristic even for
an idealized situation, ignoring the real problems to be encountered by the
developers of ballistic missile systems and measures against them, including the
offensive weapons.
Studies have shown that space-based ballistic missile defense itself is so
unbalanced that it would be safe to say that, should it be deployed, the
macrosystem of the strategic balance would have no stability reserve at all.
III.

LIMITED BMD AND THE STRATEGIC BALANCE

Following the early discussions in 1983, the emphasis now seems to have
shifted from plans and feasibility of the nationwide ballistic missile defense
designed to cover the entire United States and the territories of its allies to the
ideas associated with the feasibility of limited BMDs, namely area and point
defenses.
One cannot ignore the staggering costs and complications, as well as the
potential responses of the other side, which make President Reagan's "Star
Wars" program unrealistic.
A number of studies undertaken by both Soviet and American scientists
support the conclusion made by Soviet academicians in their Appeal to All
Scientists of the World of April 1983. They stated that antimissile weapons can
give practically nothing to a country becoming a target of a sudden massive
nuclear attack since they are unable to protect the overwhelming majority of that
country's population. It was noted with good reason that, taking into account
the countermeasures installed by the other side, such a system would also be
unable to prevent a retaliatory attack.
These obvious inferences fall on the deaf ear of SDI officials, who are
currently engaged in developments that would eventually make the course of
events irreversible. They put forward various arguments in favor of partial forms
of a BMD that they do not even claim to be effective.
They declare that even a BMD of limited capabilities, functions and scale
could be created before the year 2000 and would have a "stabilizing effect" on
the political and strategic climate in the world. As for the global BMD, it would
be with us all right, although this is a matter of long-term planning. Limited
forms of the defense system are still considered by many members of powerful
groups in the U.S. government to be at an interim stage. Remarkably enough,
there is no mention now of any constraints on using nuclear weapons in the
hypothetical antimissile systems, even in limited ones. An official document of
the U.S. State Department of June 4, 1985, reads: "We will continue to explore
the promising concepts which use nuclear energy to power devices which could
destroy ballistic missiles at great distances." 9 Influential U.S. experts, apart from
these who advocate the nuclear-bomb-pumped X-ray laser, are actively discussing
the need to use nuclear arms for antimissiles of the planned BMD against the
other side's ICBMs in the terminal phase of their trajectories.' 0
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The intermediate, less-than-perfect ballistic missile defenses are being justified, among other things, by the need to protect U.S. territory from "third
countries," i.e., nations that might acquire nuclear arms in the near future and
that could, as is believed by some Western experts, blackmail with their nuclear
weapons even the great powers. It is also maintained that a limited BMD,
although unable to handle a massive nuclear attack-neither a first nor a second
strike-on city targets and industrial areas, would nevertheless be able to shield
the country from accidental, unauthorized ICBM launches.
A limited BMD, it is maintained, would be a factor of deterrence simply
owing to the heightened uncertainties in the strategic planning of the sides.
Some high-ranking spokesmen of the U.S. government consider that it would
be desirable and feasible to deploy in the foreseeable future a number of
antimissile complexes (above all, ground- and air-based) for the point defense of
ICBM launch sites, which become ever more vulnerable to the ever more accurate
and powerful warheads.
These arguments do not hold water. Following the normal logic of politics
and strategy, one can see that a more effective way to protect nations from
nuclear blackmail, and even more so from the use of nuclear weapons, would
be to strengthen the nonproliferation regime, to ease international tension overall
and in those regions where there are near-nuclear states. Of course, in doing so
the United States and other nuclear powers would have, following the Soviet
lead, to demonstrate in practice to other nations their willingness to limit and
cut their respective nuclear arsenals, in full accordance with article VI of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Other useful measures would be some steps in the direction of reducing the
probabiltiy of a nuclear war in the spirit of the bilateral Agreement on the
Prevention of Nuclear War signed in 1973.11
During the Geneva summit, an agreement was reached for experts to study
the question of founding U.S.-Soviet nuclear risk reduction centers. 12 In this
connection the following would seem pertinent. In a special study performed by
the U.S. Strategic Air Command (on order from U.S. Senators Sam Nunn (DGa.) and John Warner (R-Va.), who are currently looking into the issue of joint
centers aimed at reducing the threat of an accidental nuclear war), nine potential
means of delivery of nuclear weapons by "third countries" are listed (including
terrorist groups). 3 Analysis of these means against the background of any, even
ideal, capabilities of future antimissile weapons suggests that none of them could
be intercepted or neutralized by a BMD, wherever the component is based-in
space, in the air, or on the ground.
As regards the uses of a BMD to protect against accidental, unauthorized
launches of nuclear-armed missiles, this may appeal to some superficial observers.
But those advocating this idea make a point of overlooking the fact that, on the
technological side, such launches might be countered by some simpler means,
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which would also be not so destabilizing from military and political standpoints,
for example, by improving the reliability of the self-destroying devices in strategic
delivery vehicles with on-board guidance systems, which would enable the vehicle
(but not the nuclear warhead) to be exploded on command from the control
center with minimal damage to the population and environment.
It is also necessary to weigh the risks of an accidental launch, not only in
terms of military, political and economic costs of the deployment of a BMD,
but also in terms of the hazards of the BMD self-activating as a result of an
error in the detection and identification system or in the battle management
system of the BMD. It was estimated that the probability of an error or a failure
in the battle management system would be much higher than the probability of
a random launch, especially if the nuclear arsenals of both sides were cut
drastically in accordance with equitable agreements (provided, of course, that the
ratio of the number of warheads of one side to the number of units in the
strategic forces of the other side be the same), and if the reliability of the early
warning and control systems were to be steadily improved.
Also contrary to the dialectics of the interplay of strategic forces as a
complicated macrosystem is the notion that was fostered by some representatives
of the Reagan Administration, that a limited BMD will introduce greater stability
into the strategic calculus on both sides owing to the mounting uncertainties of
the first-strike outcome.
First, the advocates of this thesis make a point of deliberately ignoring the
unilateral obligation of the Soviet Union not to use nuclear weapons first, which,
by the way, dictates even more severe control measures to prevent an accidental
launch of a nuclear missile. If the United States and its allies followed suit, the
world would become more stable and secure, a world with a lower probability
both of a planned first strike and of accidental missile launches.
Second, the present-day strategic situation has inherent in it a sizeable
measure of uncertainty determined by a multitude of different factors. Such
uncertainty, within certain limits, of course, could play a stabilizing role. Lower
uncertainties, for example in respect to a devastating first strike, would play an
apparent destabilizing role. On the other hand, the escalation of uncertainties
above some level that has been established in recent years seems to be quite
dangerous as well. This additional uncertainty, taken into account by the strategic
planners of one side, is bound to affect the uncertainties in the planning by the
other side, which in turn would lower the stability of the current strategic balance
and increase the threat of a nuclear war.
According to many knowledgeable experts, the uncertainties in the planning
of a devastating first strike are still too high under modern conditions. To be
sure, in the longer run the probability of such an attack could increase due to
the U.S.-initiated buildup of warheads, improvements in their accuracy and higher
yield, and also as a result of the deployment of novel means of strategic
antisubmarine warfare. But this goes to prove that there is an urgent necessity
to take definite measures to overcome the situation in which a first strike becomes
ever more attractive.
Nuclear weapons freeze, both quantitative and qualitative, would be a really
effective measure aimed at preventing the buildup of first-strike capability. This
is to be regarded as the first step in the direction of nuclear arms reduction

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 15:179

aimed at their complete elimination by the year 2000. Another important step
would be the total ban and cessation of all nuclear explosions. Specifically, such
actions of the sides would reduce the number of high-accuracy nuclear weapons
in their arsenals, i.e., weapons that would destroy hard targets and command
centers. It is also necessary to undertake agreed actions to limit antisubmarine
operations, which also undermine the strategic stability. There are also a number
other measures that could reduce the probability of a devastating first strike.
Suggestions to this effect are being put forward persistently by the Soviet Union.
These suggestions take into account the security interests of both sides and the
constructive ideas proposed in the West.
Lastly, a BMD system designed to protect ICBM launch sites in the United
States beyond the limits stipulated by the ABM Treaty of 1972 and the Protocol
thereto of 1974, as a key element of the U.S. military doctrines of "protracted"
and "limited" nuclear wars, would have a destabilizing effect as well.
The Washington strategists are toying with the idea of "limited" or "controlled" exchange of nuclear strikes against ICBM fields without damaging
industrial and administrative centers and without enormous casualties among
civilian populations, these exchanges terminating the hostilities on conditions
favorable to the United States. Soviet military doctrine, which is based on realistic
views of the nature of nuclear war, rejects the idea of its "limitedness" as
unsound and unrealistic, and hence exceedingly dangerous.
Nonetheless, the Soviet Union and its allies are forced to take into account
these concepts of U.S. political and strategic thinking, however unrealistic they
may be.
In the prenuclear era, if a nation followed unrealistic warfare schemes, this
in the first place meant that the probability of that nation being defeated in the
war increased. In a way, from a purely military point of view, this played into
the hands of the nation's potential opponents. But nowadays one has to approach
this differently. Leadership that is guided by doctrines and concepts that fail to
reflect the real nature of war and the systems character of the strategic balance,
leadership that believes in the possibility of "controlled" and "limited" warfare
using weapons of mass destruction, is heading for a war with an unpredictable
course of events, which would be bound to force it to use such means that would
eventually lead to a world catastrophe.
IV.

BMD AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

The military and political implications of the deployment of a space-based
antimissile system would, for the most part, affect the situation in Europe, as
one of the most important regions of the world.
U.S. government spokesmen have tried to persuade the Western European
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that by installing
their antimissile "shield" the United States would be able to protect not only
itself but also its allies. It is often stressed in U.S. official documents that the
United States continues to honor its commitments to President Reagan's program
whose goal is to create an "absolutely leak-proof defense" for the United States
and its allies.
Moreover, as noted by the former head of the Strategic Defense Initiative
Organization, Lieutenant General James Abrahamson, the U.S. "concept of an
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effective defense is one which protects our [American] allies as well as the United
States."

14

Is it possible in principle to provide for such a "leak-proof" defense for the
allies using the American antimissile "umbrella"?
The very concept of the proposed space-based ballistic missile defense is
based on the assumption that each layer and component of the defense is less
than perfect, and so even theoretically it cannot ensure reliable defense. Each
defensive layer is called upon to stop the "leakage" through the previous layer,
i.e., to destroy the remaining warheads.
Bringing American allies under the BMD "umbrella" would imply protecting
them from nuclear vehicles other than ICBMs. Characteristic of the European
theater are medium range ballistic missiles with depressed trajectories, shorter
flight times, and so on.
These and other factors strongly suggest that it would be impossible to apply
all the layers of the proposed space-based ballistic missile defense system to
protect Europe.
The reports published by the study teams sponsored by the Reagan Administration (i.e., Fletcher, Hoffman and others) referred to the possibility of the
advent of fast-burn boosters as a serious countermeasure. But unlike ICBMs,
medium range missiles, and even more so theater missiles, have boost phases
rmuch shorter than the above lower limit required for a boost-phase interception
layer to engage them.
Subsequent layers would also function within unrealistic time limits, since
the total flight time of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) is two or three
times shorter than that of ICBMs. The task of the subsequent layers would also
be made more difficult because the attack could not be weakened markedly by
the previous BMD layers.
Since MRBMs fly at a lower altitude than ICBMs in their midcourse phase,
this excludes or at least limits the uses in the European theater of many laser
types due to substantial atmospheric absorption of laser beams. Using lasers
whose beams penetrate the atmosphere would be hindered by the typically overcast
skies over Europe. In addition, low flight altitudes would require more spacebased BMD components to be constantly on station there, since the ranges of
the weapons would be shorter.
Additional demand would be imposed on kinetic energy weapons. The altitude
of an orbit of a space-based battle station is selected depending on the total
number of carriers and its active service life in orbit. The lower trajectories of
MRBMs and their shorter exoatmospheric flight times would call for either longer
ranges of the antimissile projectiles (and hence, more sophisticated designs) or
lower orbits for the stations with all the implied consequences, the most crippling
one being the need to shorten the in-orbit life of the station.
In short, the proposed American BMD would be even less effective for
overpopulated Europe (which would suffer badly in any case) than for the United
States itself.
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It is also worth noting that destroying from space many nuclear weapon
delivery means deployed in the European theater seems infeasible in general. This
applies to bombers, cruise missiles (ground-, air-, and sea-based), "nuclear
artillery" and some other vehicles, which together account for thousands of units
of nuclear weapons, including theater weapons.
The evolution of the tasks of the SDI program (its initial goal was to protect
the territory and population of the United States) has led to a renewal of interest
in area and point BMD complexes for Europe as well. Emphasis on these ABM
defense complexes would imply the predominant development of what is called
the terminal interception layer of a BMD. There is a significant measure of
similarity between the technical means of an area and a point ABM defense
system and the terminal interception layer of a comprehensive space-based BMD.
It is often held that for Europe the best form of antimissile system is limited
BMD, since the terminal velocity of warheads of MRBMs and other similar
vehicles is much lower than that of ICBMs. However, one should not overlook
the fact that, as a result of other characteristics of their trajectories, the flight
time from the beginning of the selection of decoys to the target is practically the
same due to atmospheric effects.
As with a comprehensive space-based BMD, local BMD could be thwarted
by a set of relatively cheap countermeasures which might, for example, easily
deceive the sensors of battle management systems.
Should relatively efficient point BMD be deployed to protect, say, ballistic
missile silos primarily against MRBMs, one possible countermeasure could be to
saturate the defense with targets.
The concept of limited (area or point) defense is, as a rule, associated with
the defense of and area on which some important strategic installation is located.
Selection of an area should be guided by some criteria. But in Europe, because
of its dense population and concentration of industry, it would be hardly possible
to single out certain regions of special importance. Also, there are no ICBM
fields here whose protection would warrant a BMD complex.
Admittedly, for a certain offense-to-defense ratio local BMD complexes
could reduce local devastation, but overall this does not contradict the thesis that
for Europe a comprehensive space-based antimissile system would be ineffective
in a full-scale nuclear conflict.
But there is more to it than this. According to the ABM Treaty of 1972,
the United States undertook "not to transfer to other States and not to deploy
outside its national territory ABM systems or their components" (article IX). It
follows thus that any joint activities of the United States and its allies to implement
the SDI plans would eventually be a direct violation of the Treaty. The same is
true of the point ABM defense, which is claimed officially to be an MRBM
defense, although it can also be used as an ICBM defense, which is a violation
of article VI of the ABM Treaty.
This, however, does not stop certain groups in the United States and in
some of its allied countries from joining forces in developing a space-based
antimissile system.
Now the SDI program supporters appeal for stronger integration of the
United States and its Western European allies in the political, military and
economic spheres. The U.S. government is looking forward to gaining from such
cooperation by augmenting its technological, economic and manpower resources,
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even without actually bringing them in from other countries, with overseas
research and development organizations simply carrying out American contracts.
Representatives of the U.S. government explore every avenue to draw into
the SDI program governmental and private organizations in Western Europe.
Some countries have already agreed to participate in SDI efforts. The SDI
officials are confident that many European firms, whatever the official stand of
their respective governments, will be unwilling to lose major contracts and will
join the SDI program. One of the incentives for such firms may be fears of not
gaining access to American technologies in the course of the SDI work. These
fears, by the way, also predetermine the nature of discussions in the govermental,
industrial and academic circles of some European countries. For their part,
Reagan Administration spokesmen, in their attempts to lure European private
firms, lavished promises upon these firms of billion-dollar contracts concerning
SDI.
The wide involvement of Western European business in implementing U.S.
plans for militarizing space is pregnant with hazards of destabilizing the international situation. If involved in the Star Wars program, Western European
firms in the various sectors of business would, for one thing, give a mighty
impetus to the work, and for the other, would become a powerful SDI lobby in
Western Europe. In consequence, by involving Western European private business
the U.S. government would be able to make European countries more dependent
on U.S. policy-another contribution to international tensions.
Much in the position of the Western European allies of the United States
stems from their false views and false ambitions. For example, the desire of the
Federal Republic of Germany to get a finger in the SDI pie is explained, if only
partially, by the fact that, being a NATO member and a possessor of significant
economic potential, this nation has no nuclear weapons, and so, according to
some of its leaders, it cannot play a fitting role in world policy. The West
German leadership is thus looking forward, through the country's participation
in the Star Wars program, to gaining indirect access to nuclear arms. Some highranking politicians in that country state that only by participating in the SDI
could West Germany and other European countries increase their influence in
the international community.
But these illusions are dangerous and senseless-the international prestige of
any country has nothing to do with its military might. Also illusionary are the
hopes of acquiring some defensive superweapons. Western Europeans will only
be "entrusted" with secondary and, obviously, isolated projects. The United
States is not interested in strengthening its allies in such an important sphere and
will never reconcile itself to the possibility of undermining its own security
through possible leakages of sensitive military information abroad.
Introduction of a new element into the nuclear calculus in Europe, just as
in the world at large, will appreciably complicate and entangle the assessments
of the actual capabilities of the sides and will hinder the search for objective
criteria of parity and the observation of the principle of equality and equal
security. One cannot help agreeing with those Western researchers who note that
a BMD will "leave Europe as vulnerable as before." 5

15.

HAWKS, DovEs & OwiLs 88 (G. Allison, A. Carnesale & J. New eds. 1985).

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 15:179

The attitude of Western European countries to the SDI program becomes a
touchstone in inter-European relations. So, already now we witness one of the
most serious complications of the last decades in French-West German relations
caused by the differences in the two countries' attitudes to the SDI. Whereas
West Germany endeavours to get from the United Sta tes a separate package of
projects within the SDI framework, France suggests the Western European Eureka
project, which is counterposed to the American project and is meant as a way
to cement Western Europe by stimulating the development of science and technology on the continent. The results of the research and development projects
could be used for military purposes as well. This could not but influence the
political climate of Europe as a whole.
Attempts to involve Western European countries in SDI create well-founded
concerns in realistically thinking Europeans about the fate of the ABM Treaty
of 1972 and about the future of detente on the continent. Security cannot be
strengthened by one side's attempts to create a superior system of arms (even if
called defensive). The inclusion of the Europeans would only increase the number
of people having delusions concerning the true purposes and real possibilities of
the SDI, would result in a great deal of time and resources wasted, would
undermine the Western European economy and would raise the level of risks on
the European continent.
Some of the American proponents of SDI believe that if both the United
States and the U.S.S.R. had BMDs, this would do away with some of the
problems of the strategic balance between East and West owing to the devaluation
of the French and British nuclear forces. But this is a mistake, at least because
one could hardly expect that France and the United Kingdom would remain
passive observers if confronted with such a course of affairs. It is quite obvious
that the many countermeasures, including the modernization and buildup of
offensive nuclear weapons and some active countermeasures, would be available
in each of the two nations, let alone in a wider Western European union.
Overall, many things suggest that the arguments of the American (or NATO)
"shield" to protect Western Europe are attractive for some Europeans. The
above analysis leads one to conclude that the real goal of U.S. strategists is to
use the shield in a crisis to protect the United States from a retaliatory strike,
and to use Europe as an arena in which the battle might be fought out. This
conclusion is supported by the fact that the United States did not undertake not
to use nuclear weapons first, which for Europe, with its strategic geopolitical
position, is an especially ominous sign.
The national leaders of those Western European countries which plan to
contribute in some form or another to the SDI effort try to influence the public
opinion of their countries by arguing that they are only planning to participate
in the research and development work and, as for the actual deployment of a
BMD system, this is going to be the subject of separate talks with the United
States. But by the time of those talks, Western Europeans will be head over ears
in SDI projects which, as noted above, will produce a powerful lobby including
military industrialists and related politicians that will push through the deployment
of space-based BMD.
What is more, the talks between the United States and its allies can simply
be used as a cover, as was really the case before the deployment of American
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medium range missiles in Europe, when the so-called "double track" decision
was taken.
In fundamental matters, when handling the issue of the expediency of
antimissile systems, the United States often just "forgot" the interests of its
allies. For Western European political leaders, official statements of the U.S.
government about its plans with respect to the deployment of a BMD for the
most part came quite unexpectedly. Recall the beginning of 1967, when President
Lyndon B. Johnson promulgated his plans to deploy ABM defense systems and
submitted to the U.S. Congress a request to allocate the required $375 million.
The Nixon Administration behaved similarly in 1969, when it decided to revise
in principle the structure of the planned ABM defense system and switch from
its planned "thin" defense based on the Sentinel missiles to an ABM defense
based on launch sites for the Safeguard missiles. Also out of the blue for the
allies came President Reagan's March 23, 1983, speech, which gave a fresh
impetus to the development of a comprehensive ballistic missile defense.
There are no grounds for believing that when dealing with further stages of
the development of the SDI plans the U.S. leadership will provide more information to its allies and consult with them about its plans. There will, of course,
be exceptions, in situations like the present one, when the United States itself
needs support for its program (in a wide variety of forms) from its allies. This
warrants the inference that, in addition to the allies' resources, another interest
the United States seeks in Europe is to enlist political support for the SDI
program.
According to official documents of the U.S. Department of Defense, both
sides will acquire their space-based BMD's in a more favorable international
climate than currently exists. It is stated that "a deployment of defensive systems
would most usefully occur in the context of a cooperative, equitable, and verifiable
arms control environment that regulates the offensive and defensive developments
and deployments of the United States and Soviet Union." If the American side
really thinks so, it would perhaps be more logical to expedite now the development
of agreements to this effect, all the more so since, even from the viewpoint of
SDI proponents, the program would be hard to realize otherwise. Clearly, the
Soviet Union will never sign a treaty with the United States that does not meet
the conditions of equality and equal security. These arrangements would be better
safeguards of peace, for Europe too, than those that, in the opinion of the
United States, could provide for any form of BMD. It would also be of
importance that this approach would prevent a senseless waste of enormous funds
and brainpower.
The inclusion of Western European countries in the U.S. Star Wars program
may be seen as a victory of adventurism in Western European policy; it would
imply a new round of arms race destabilizing the strategic balance instead of
reducing arms in Europe.
Real security on the European continent cannot be achieved through the
militarization of space or the deployment of new weapons on the ground. A
major landmark on the path to a stable Europe was the realization of the
proposals made by General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev in his statement of
January 15, 1986, to ban completely Soviet and American medium range missiles
in Europe, both ballistic and cruise. To this end, the United States must undertake
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not to supply American-made strategic and medium range missiles to other
countries, and the United Kingdom and France not to build up their respective
nuclear arsenals. The Soviet Union will do the same. The realization of the
further stages of the plan as proposed by the Soviet Union will completely free
16
Europe of nuclear arms.
V.

CONCLUSION

To sum up, should the United States go on with its plans of developing and
deploying one or another of the versions of the proposed space-based ballistic
missile defense, this would erode the macrosystem of the strategic balance. A
combination of antimissile weapons, developed and deployed beyond what is
allowed by the ABM Treaty of 1972, and offensive nuclear weapons makes the
strategic equilibrium less stable than without the BMD. Even if the U.S.S.R.
installs its countermeasures to restore strategic parity, the military and political
balance will in reality be less stable, if one takes into account those factors of
instability which are inherent in the comprehensive space-based ballistic missile
defense system.
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